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Abstract
Image forensics is an increasingly relevant problem, as
it can potentially address online disinformation campaigns
and mitigate problematic aspects of social media. Of par-
ticular interest, given its recent successes, is the detection
of imagery produced by Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs), e.g. ‘deepfakes’. Leveraging large training sets
and extensive computing resources, recent work has shown
that GANs can be trained to generate synthetic imagery
which is (in some ways) indistinguishable from real im-
agery. We analyze the structure of the generating network
of a popular GAN implementation [7], and show that the
network’s treatment of color is markedly different from a
real camera in two ways. We further show that these two
cues can be used to distinguish GAN-generated imagery
from camera imagery, demonstrating effective discrimina-
tion between GAN imagery and real camera images used to
train the GAN.
1. Introduction
With the increasing importance of social media as a
means of disseminating news, online disinformation cam-
paigns have gotten significant attention in recent years. The
dated phrase ‘seeing is believing’ is still descriptive of how
people validate such stories, though, so image forensics
is increasingly important. While social media makes the
dissemination of fake news easier, computer vision tools
have contributed to this trend by making it easier to gener-
ate fake imagery. Whereas an image manipulator in prior
years would need significant experience with rendering
and/or image manipulation software, modern data-driven
approaches have made it much easier to generate artificial
imagery from scratch.
Our paper concerns the development of forensics to
detect imagery from Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs). While these are indistinguishable from real im-
agery to the GAN’s discriminator, they differ in important
ways from images taken by a camera. We analyze the struc-
ture of the generator network, paying particular attention
Figure 1. Example artifacts evident in GAN-generated imagery.
Top image shows checkerboard artifacts introduced by deconvolu-
tion steps. Bottom image shows mismatched eye colors, similar to
a cue used in existing forensics [9].
to how it forms color, and note two important differences.
First, the generator’s internal values are normalized to con-
strain the outputs, in a way which limits the frequency of
saturated pixels. Second, the generator’s multi-channel in-
ternal representation is collapsed to red, green, and blue
channels in a way that’s similar to models of color image
formation, but uses weights that are quite different than the
analogous spectral sensitivities of a camera. We investigate
the effectiveness of these two cues in detecting two types
of GAN imagery: one being imagery wholly generated by
a GAN and the other where GAN-generated faces replace
real faces in a larger image.
Our approach is based on an analysis of the GAN gener-
ator architecture, and is complementary to approaches that
detect visual artifacts in the synthesized imagery. While
these two types of approaches are complementary, the rapid
pace of GAN developments will likely mitigate the ef-
fectiveness of artifact-based detection. In particular, the
checkerboard artifacts illustrated in Fig. 1 have already
been mitigated [11] by replacing deconvolution steps with
up-sampling followed by convolution steps. Additional
cues, such as mismatched eye colors or a lack of blinking
in GAN-generated video [9] are similarly likely to be elim-
inated.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
08
24
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
9 D
ec
 20
18
2. Related Work
Since their introduction in 2014 [3], GANs have quickly
become an extremely valuable tool in a range of computer
vision applications. At a high level, the concept of a GAN is
that two networks are trained to compete with one another.
The ‘generator’ network is trained to produce artificial im-
agery that is indistinguishable from a given dataset of real
imagery, whereas the ‘discriminator’ is trained to correctly
classify imagery as being either real or coming from the
generator. Early attempts at this [14] were able to gener-
ate convincing imagery of simple image datasets such as
MNIST digits [8], but had a harder time mimicking more
complicated images. More recently, computational tech-
niques have been introduced which can generate convinc-
ing facial imagery [7] and have increased the resolution of
generated imagery [16].
In response to the development of GANs, the forensics
community has begun to develop methods to detect whether
or not a given image was generated by a network trained in a
GAN framework (for brevity, we refer to the detection tar-
gets as ‘GAN images’, and seek to distinguish them from
‘real images’). One such method [9] uses the lack of blink-
ing in DeepFake-type videos to detect GAN videos. Other
approaches, rather than leveraging semantically-meaningful
cues, use machine learning and neural networks to distin-
guish GAN from real images. Marra et al. [10] use a net-
work based on XceptionNet, Hsu et al. [5] develop a deep
forgery discriminator with a contrastive loss function, and
Guera and Delp [4] use recurrent neural networks to de-
tect GAN video. A key concern with methods based on
deep networks is that they could easily be incorporated into
the GAN’s discriminator and, with additional training, the
generator could be fine-tuned in order to learn a counter-
measure for any differentiable forensic. An exclusively
learning-based approach also makes it difficult to explain
the outputs of the network, which is necessary in some
forensics applications. Our approach, which is comple-
mentary to the above-mentioned forensics, is to analyze the
structure of the GAN’s generator and see how it impacts
image statistics.
3. GAN Generator Architecture
In this section, we review the network architecture of
the GAN’s generator, and propose two specific cues which
could be used to distinguish GAN imagery from real im-
agery. Since generators use different structures from one
GAN to another, we look at features which are common
among GANs. Also, in order to improve the detectability,
we focus our attention on the later layers of the generator,
since cues introduced in these layers are less likely to be
modulated by subsequent processing.
Figure 2 shows a representative generator architecture,
Figure 2. Example of the generator architecture from [7]. The
high-resolution image is produced from an input ‘latent vector’ by
repeated upsampling (doubling the spatial dimensions), followed
by 3x3 convolutions with leaky-ReLU activations and pixel-wise
normalization. The final color image is generated by a 1x1 convo-
lution.
which expands a learned feature representation of the de-
sired class to an image of such an object. The last layer of
the generator, in particular, produces a 3-by-W -by-H out-
put array: an image having 3 color channels, W columns,
and H rows. The input to this last layer is an array of size
K-by-W -by-H , where the K > 3 layers are referred to
as ‘depth’ layers. The conversion of the K depth layers to
the red, green, and blue color channels provide two poten-
tial forensics cues, which will be described in the following
sections.
3.1. Color Image Formation
To the extent that the last network layer collapses K >
3 depth layers to red, green, and blue color channels, it is
similar to the mechanism by which a camera’s color filter
array integrates light over three wavebands to form a color
image [6]. Figure 3 illustrates this analogy. The multiple
depth layers are combined in a weighted sum to create a
color value at each pixel, with the weights being uniform
over the spatial extent of the output. In some cases, e.g. [7],
the last convolution has a non-singleton dimension in only
the depth direction (Figure 3 left); in others, e.g. [16], the
convolution has a larger spatial extent, as well.
When the color filter array on a camera’s sensor col-
lapses the visible spectrum to RGB values, the ‘weighting’
of light at different wavelengths is represented by the spec-
tral response function. Spectral response functions vary
from camera to camera, but are driven by several con-
straints:
1. In order to allow for saturation and eliminate cross-
talk, the spectral response functions for red, green, and
blue have limited overlap.
2. Because the sensor counts photons that pass through
the color filter array, spectral response functions must
be non-negative.
Figure 3. (Left) The last layers of a GAN’s generator collapse multiple ‘depth’ layers to red, green, and blue pixel values via convolutions
that span the depth layers, but have limited spatial extent. (Center) The weights used for face image synthesis in [7] to collapse 16 depth
layers to red, green, and blue are plotted. (Right) By contrast, the spectral responses of real cameras’ color filter arrays [2] vary from
camera to camera, but have a structure which is quite different than the learned weights of a GAN.
Neither of these constraints apply in the case of a synthetic
generator, which doesn’t need to count photons. By allow-
ing negative weights, saturation can result even if there is
significant overlap between the weights learned for differ-
ent channels. Indeed, Fig. 3 (center) shows the 16 weights
learned to synthesize face images in [7], which share a com-
mon peak across the three color channels and are correlated
at several non-peak values, as well. By contrast, Fig. 3
(right) shows the spectral response functions for two differ-
ent Canon cameras, which have different peak wavelengths
for each channel and relatively less overlap in their sensitiv-
ities.
3.2. Normalization
Another common process in GAN generators is the use
of normalizations, which are employed in order to encour-
age convergence in training. As with color image formation,
the exact method of normalization varies from one GAN to
the next. In [7], pixel-wise normalization is applied after
convolution layers, so that the values of the ‘depth’ vector
at each pixel have a fixed magnitude, i.e.
bj,x,y =
aj,x,y√
1
N
∑N−1
c=0 (ac,x,y)
2 + 
, (1)
where a is an unnormalized feature map, b is the pixel-wise
normalized version, indices x and y denote the spatial loca-
tion of the pixel, indices j and c denote the depth position
in the feature map, N denotes the number of feature maps,
and  = 10−8. In [16], normalization is applied within the
individual ‘depth’ planes as,
bn,c,x,y = γn,c
(
an,c,x,y − µn,c
σn,c
)
+ βn,c (2)
µn,c =
1
HW
W−1∑
x=0
H−1∑
y=0
an,c,x,y (3)
σn,c =
√√√√1/HW W−1∑
x=0
H−1∑
y=0
(an,c,x,y − µn,c)2 +  , (4)
where b and a are the normalized and unnormalized feature
maps (respectively), x and y specify the spatial position of
the pixel, c denotes the depth channel, n indexes the image
in the mini-batch, and the parameters β and γ are learned
during the training process to constrain the mean and vari-
ance of values within the feature map depth planes.
Regardless of whether the normalization is applied pixel-
or layer-wise, the result of both steps will be to have a rela-
tively uniform distribution in the unit interval. These well-
behaved values are then transformed into RGB intensities
as described above. In camera-based imaging, however in-
tensity values are not nicely constrained. Instead, irradi-
ance values incident on a camera’s sensor generally have a
logarithmic distribution, necessitating high dynamic range
(HDR) imaging [13]. HDR imaging involves the capture
of multiple images separated by one or more stops (binary
orders of magnitude) of exposure, e.g. images exposed for
1/15, 1/30, and 1/60 second. Without HDR, camera images
generally have regions of saturation and/or under-exposure,
as shown in Fig. 4. Because of the normalizations applied
in the generator, however, GAN images lack these regions.
4. Detection Methods
In this section, we propose detection methods based on
each of the above analyses, in order to understand the pre-
dictive power of these cues. Given a relatively small set of
training data, it is necessary to utilize pre-trained models
Figure 4. Example images (top row) and grayscale histograms (bottom row) for two real images (left, right) and one GAN image (center)
from [7]. Whereas the real images feature regions of under- or over-exposure (left and right images, respectively), GAN images (e.g.,
center) lack regions of saturation even when the background is white.
(where applicable) or to use lower dimensionality features
that can be trained with the data on hand.
4.1. Color Image Forensics
Intuitively, the overlap between the weights which map
depth layers to RGB colors shown in Fig. 3 (center) should
manifest themselves in a high correlation between color
channels at a given pixel than would be evident from a real
camera having spectral sensitivities similar to the Canon
curves shown in Fig. 3 (right). To investigate this, we use
the standard rg chromaticity space, where
r =
R
R+G+B
and g =
G
R+G+B
. (5)
We expect that GAN images will have higher than normal
correlations in this space, but that the correlations will have
no spatial component due to the fact that the color conver-
sion (at least in the case of [7]) is applied independently at
each pixel. The evaluate the effectiveness of this cue for
forensics, we adapt the method of Chen et al. [1], which
uses bivariate histograms for a forensics task. In that work,
the authors demonstrate that pixel-wise statistical relation-
ships between intensity and noise can be used to detect fo-
cus manipulations, by building Intensity Noise Histograms
(INH) which are classified by a deep network similar to
VGG ([15]). In our case, the r and g chromaticity coor-
dinates serve as the two variables, and the INH network is
used classify these histograms as being a GAN image or a
camera image.
We use a pre-trained version of INH from [1], and fine-
tune the classifier with r-vs.-g histograms from a set of
GAN imagery produced by [7] and a set of camera imagery
used in the training of the GAN.
4.2. Saturation-based Forensics
For this forensic, the hypothesis is that the frequency
of saturated and under-exposed pixels will be suppressed
by the generator’s normalization steps. This suggests a
straightforward GAN image detector, where we simply
measure the frequency of saturated and under-exposed pix-
els in each image. Specifically, for over-exposed pixels we
measure a set of features
foi =
1
HW
‖{(x, y) | I(x, y) ≥ τoi }‖, (6)
for τoi ∈ {240, 245, 250, 255} (for an 8 bit representation of
pixel intensities). Similarly, the frequency of under-exposed
pixels are measured as features
fui =
1
HW
‖{(x, y) | I(x, y) ≤ τui }‖, (7)
for τui ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15}.
These features are classified by a linear Support Vec-
tor Machine (SVM), trained using Matlab’s fitcsvm func-
tion. The training data consisted of features from 1387
GAN-generated images (randomly sub-sampled from the
30 LSUN [17] categories of images created by the GAN
in [7]), and real camera images from the ImageNet dataset.
5. Evaluation
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our two detection
methods, we experimented with two benchmark datasets
produced in conjunction with the US National Institute
of Standards and Technology’s Media Forensics Challenge
2018 [12]. The two datasets address two different sets of
GAN imagery:
1. GAN Crop images represent smaller image regions
which are either entirely GAN-generated or not.
2. GAN Full images are mostly camera images, but some
faces have been replaced by a GAN-generated face,
similar to deep fakes.
For both datasets, we compute the features (histograms
or saturation count features) over the entire image, even
though GAN Full images have small manipulated regions
around faces. Following on the convention, we present
our detectors’ performance via a Receiver Operator Char-
acteristic (ROC) curve, showing the true detection and false
alarm rate as a function of a decision threshold applied
to the continuously-varied score output by each classifier.
In an ROC curve, the performance of a random classifier
would be a diagonal line. We also summarize the ROC with
its Area Under the Curve (AUC), which would be 0.5 for a
random detector and 1 for a perfect detector.
5.1. Saturation Statistics
Figure 5 shows the ROC curve for our SVM trained on
over-exposure features fo. For both datasets, the perfor-
mance is significantly better than a random detector. The
method clearly does a better job of detecting fully GAN-
generated images, where it produces a 0.7 AUC. In part this
follows from a better match to the images used in training,
but also the features’ measuring a proportion of saturated
pixels will be further diluted by the non-GAN regions in
the GAN Full images. Despite this, the method still pro-
duces a respectable ROC and 0.61 AUC on the GAN Full
image set.
Interestingly, as shown in Fig. 6, the performance of
the method decreases when the SVM is presented a feature
vector consisting of both under- and over-exposed pixel fre-
quencies, i.e. fu and fo. The AUC is reduced from 0.70
to 0.67, and has a notably lower correct detection rate at a
0.5 false alarm rate. Though it’s not immediately obvious
why the under-exposed features should be less predictive
than over-exposed pixel frequencies, one hypothesis is the
asymmetric shape of the Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) as
activations in [7]. That said, the SVM could have learned to
ignore the additional features from fu, but failed to do so
from the training data provided.
5.2. Color Image Forensics
Unfortunately, the ROC curves from the color image
forensic, shown in Fig. 7, are little better than random. With
AUCs of 0.56 and 0.54 on the two datasets, there isn’t much
Figure 5. ROC curves showing the performance of the saturation
frequency SVM on the two GAN datasets from [12].
Figure 6. ROC curves showing the performance of the saturation
and under-exposed frequency SVM on GAN crop.
evidence that the classifier learned anything useful about the
color statistics of GAN- versus camera-generated imagery.
One possible reason for this is that some of the camera im-
agery in the evaluation sets contain images with the type of
focus manipulations that the pre-trained INH network was
intended to detect. As an example, Fig. 4 (top right) shows a
picture in which the left and top edges appear to be blurred.
Since these images are taken from a set of celebrity face
images, it may be that they have been re-touched in ways
that INH considers a manipulation. This could potentially
be addressed by re-training the entire network, though that
would require much more training data than was used in the
present experiments.
Figure 7. ROC curves showing the performance of the color image
forensic to the GAN datasets.
6. Conclusion
We have described and evaluated the efficacy of two
different forensics related to the way in which generator
networks from GANs transform feature representations to
red, green, and blue pixel intensities. We demonstrated,
in particular, that a relatively simple forensic based on
the frequency of over-exposed pixels provides good dis-
crimination between GAN-generated and camera imagery,
via experiments with an independently-generated challenge
dataset. Our method does quite well distinguishing fully
GAN-generated image from natural images, and that it still
provided some discrimination in the more difficult case
where GAN-generated faces are spliced into a larger camera
image. A second forensic, based on color image statistics,
proved less useful than saturation statistics, but was likely
limited by the lack of available training data.
Both of these forensics were proposed based on a thor-
ough analysis of the generator’s architecture, specifically
how it transforms a multi-channel feature map into a 3-
channel color image. We show that the weights applied to
the features are analogous to how color filter arrays inte-
grate over the visible spectrum, but that they use very dif-
ferent weights. Our saturation forensic was based on the
fact that generators incorporate normalization which limits
the range of generated intensities, a limitation which is not
present in the irradiance of natural scenes. We have de-
veloped these forensics by targeting operations common to
multiple generator architectures, including very recent work
from the last year.
That said, the pace of GAN-related innovation is quite
high, and it’s hard to predict how generators will be struc-
tured in the years ahead. We hope that the type of analysis
here could encourage similar analyses of future GANs, in
order to help address an important problem impacting in-
creasingly large parts of society.
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